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Abstract
We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well-
known student and school optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two different fictitious
students creation manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. While the student and
school optimal stable mechanisms turn out to be weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclic
(Ergin (2002)) and essentially homogeneous (Kojima (2013)) priority structures, respectively,
they still lack strong fictitious student-proofness. We then compare the mechanisms in terms
of their vulnerability to manipulations in the sense of Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) and find
out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more manipulable than the school-optimal
one. Lastly, in the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak (2009), the student-optimal
stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large.
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1 Introduction
Initiated by Gale and Shapley (1962), matching theory has been fruitful both in the-
ory and practice. Theoretical findings have been successfully applied to real-life problems,
including doctor assignments, student placements, and kidney exchanges. It has been docu-
mented that the theoretically appealing stability notion of Gale and Shapley (1962) has also
proved to be very critical for the well-working of real-life matching markets.1
Fortunately, Gale and Shapley (1962) show the existence of a stable solution through
introducing the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm. This positive result, however, has
not solved all the problems of matching market design, especially regarding the strategic
ones. Roth (1982) shows that no stable mechanism is immune to preference manipulations.
However, in the one-to-one matching setting where either side’s preferences are common
knowledge, there exists a stable and strategy-proof mechanism (Dubins and Freedman (1981),
Roth (1982)). As well as preference misreporting, So¨nmez (1997, 1999) show that no stable
mechanism is immune to capacity and pre-arrangement manipulations, respectively. Some
recent related papers on manipulation incentives in matching markets include Kojima (2011),
Kojima and Pathak (2009), Afacan (2012, 2013), and Kesten (2012).
In the current study, we investigate another channel via which schools could potentially
manipulate matching mechanisms. Yokoo et al. (2004) study the bidders’ incentives to
submit bids under fictitious names in combinatorial auctions. On the other hand, as cor-
responding manipulation in the school choice context, one can think of a situation where
schools create fictitious students in the hope of getting better assignments. This paper,
thereby, studies the schools’ fictitious students creation incentives under two well-known
matching mechanisms.
We first introduce two different manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. In
the strong one, schools encounter two natural constraints in creating fictitious students: they
can not affect the preference profile of “non-fictitious” (real) students and the relative priority
1For an excellent source, refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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rankings of schools over them. On the other hand, for the weak one, we also impose that
fictitious students have to be either unassigned or matched with the school which created
them. Then, unfortunately, it turns out that both the student and school-optimal stable
mechanisms are not even weakly fictitious student-proof.
Given the above negative result, we look for some structure on the primitives helping us to
gain fictitious student-proofness. The extant literature shows that the student-optimal stable
mechanism admits good properties (including strategic ones) under Ergin (2002)’s acyclic
priority structures,2 which makes acyclicity a worthwhile condition to consider. The student-
optimal stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity. However,
it still lacks strong fictitious student-proofness. The school-optimal stable mechanism, on
the other hand, is not weakly fictitious student-proof even under acyclicity. This leads us to
look for a stronger condition for the school-optimal stable rule. A recent paper by Kojima
(2013) shows that in the many-to-many matching environment, the student-optimal stable
mechanism becomes strategy-proof and Pareto efficient if and only if the priority structure is
“essentially homogeneous”. Fortunately, essential homogeneity proves useful in the current
paper as well: the school-optimal stable mechanism is weakly fictitious student-proof if the
schools’ priorities are essentially homogeneous.
In spite of the above positive results, both acyclicity and essential homogeneity require
strong conditions in that the schools’ priorities would barely satisfy them. Therefore instead
of assuming them, we next compare the manipulability of the mechanisms on problem basis
a la Pathak and So¨nmez (2013). Even though the school-optimal stable mechanism requires
a stronger priority condition for the weak immunity than the student-optimal stable rule
does, interestingly, the latter is “more manipulable” than the former. That is, the student-
optimal stable mechanism is strongly manipulable via creating fictitious students at any
problem where so is the school-optimal rule, and there is a problem instance at which the
latter is not manipulable, yet the former is.
2Please refer to the Related Literature section for details.
3
Lastly, we investigate the scope of fictitious student manipulations under the student-
optimal stable mechanism in large markets. The existing literature (Roth and Peranson
(1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), Kojima and Pathak (2009), and Hatfield et al.
(2011)) shows that some of the undesirable properties of mechanisms may disappear as the
number of participants goes to infinity. Motivated by this fact, we employ the large market
setting of Kojima and Pathak (2009) and address the question of whether the same is true
for fictitious student manipulations as well. To this end, we show that instead of considering
fictitious student manipulations, we can consider a certain type of priority misreporting in
the sense that whenever there is a room for manipulation of the former kind, then so is there
of the latter kind. This result enables us to directly apply the results of Kojima and Pathak
(2009) for fictitious student manipulations as well: the student-optimal stable mechanism
becomes weakly fictitious student-proof under some regularity conditions as the number of
participants goes to infinity.
Why should we care about fictitious students creation manipulations? From the well-
known comparative statistics result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985b), we know that under
both the student and school optimal stable mechanisms, the fictitious student manipulation
leads real students to be at least weakly worse off, with at least one of them being strictly
worse off. This means that such manipulations result in Pareto inferior outcomes to what
would otherwise arise.3 The social planner, hence, should take this kind of manipulation
possibilities into account in the matching market design. A related policy recommendation
of the paper is that the social planner might influence the schools’ priorities in a way that
makes them acyclic (essentially homogeneous) to avoid manipulations under the student
(school)-optimal stable mechanism.
3Since schools are considered as objects to be consumed in the school choice problems, only the students’
welfare matters (in our setting, naturally, only the welfare of real ones is considered).
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Two conceptual issues are whether schools are strategic agents and whether their prior-
ities reflect their actual preferences. In the conventional school choice model, it is assumed
that schools are just objects to be consumed and their priorities are exogenously given based
on certain criteria imposed by law.4 Hence, neither they are assumed to be strategic agents
nor their priorities necessarily reflect their actual preferences. However, there are some
student placement systems where schools can influence their priorities. Hence, schools can
be strategic and their priorities can reflect their actual preferences. The New York City
school district (see Abdulkadiroglu (2011) for details), which is the largest one in USA, is an
example for such student placement system.
Another related concern is whether schools manipulate mechanisms via creating fictitious
students in real-life problems? This paper demonstrates the potential for such manipula-
tions rather than claiming that they certainly exist in real-life problems. Indeed, generally
speaking, it is very difficult to identify manipulations even the well-known ones: preference,
capacity, pre-arrangements in real-life problems. Even though one figures out that a partic-
ipant misreports its private information, it is difficult to argue that it does so in the hope
of getting better outcome. However, we can at least argue that schools indeed can create
fake students; hence, such manipulations are feasible in real-life problems. Falsified resi-
dency frauds were documented in some school districts in US. For instance, in the Methuen
School District (Boston), eighty-one students were identified to commit falsified residency
fraud in 2011. Similarly, forty-one students were identified in the Deer Park School Dis-
trict (New York) in 2012.5 Hence, it would not hard to think of a situation where schools
ask students to falsify their residency information to get them to participate in matching.6
Another real-life situation making fake identities feasible is separate matching processes for
different types of schools. Private school admissions in New York are decentralized, hence,
4Such as the proximity of students’ houses to schools and which schools their siblings are attending (if
applicable).
5For more such instances, one may refer to http://www.verifyresidence.com/blog/
6Note that such students with their true residency records might be ineligible to participate in the
matching or low priority ones having no effect on the matching outcome.
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separated from the public schools centralized matching process. Indeed, New York pub-
lic school admissions involve separate centralized matching processes for different types of
schools as well. Namely, there are two different types of public schools called “mainstream”
and “exam” schools. Students are processed separately for each type of schools at different
dates, therefore, they might learn their particular type school assignments well before than
the other school type’s matching takes place.7 In such an environment, public schools might
ask students to participate in their own centralized matching process even though they are
sure to go to private or other type of public schools.8
2 Related Literature
This paper is broadly related to the extensive literature on manipulations in matching
markets. In the two-sided matching context, Roth (1982) shows that no stable mecha-
nism is strategy-proof.9 Nonetheless, in the one-to-one matching setting, if one side of the
market has commonly known preferences, then there exists a strategy-proof stable mech-
anism (Dubins and Freedman (1981),Roth (1982)). As well as preference manipulations,
So¨nmez (1997, 1999) prove that no stable mechanism is non-manipulable via capacities and
pre-arrangements respectively. Similarly, Afacan (2013) shows that no stable mechanism
is immune to application fee manipulations. Given these impossibility results, Pathak and
So¨nmez (2013) introduce a new methodology to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability
to manipulations based on the room for strategizing across problems.
The acyclicity (Ergin (2002)) and essential homogeneity (Kojima (2013)) conditions prove
critical in the current paper. There are other related studies sharing the same point. Ergin
(2002) shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof10 under
7Both types of public schools have centralized admission processes. For details, the reader could refer to
http://schools.nyc.gov/default.htm.
8As already pointed out previously, New York City public schools can determine their priorities; hence,
they can reflect their actual preferences (for details, see Abdulkadiroglu (2011)).
9A mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent ever benefits from misreporting his preference.
10A mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of agents ever has incentive to misreport their prefer-
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acyclic priority structures. Kojima (2011) demonstrates that under the student-optimal
stable mechanism, no individual student is better off by first misreporting his preference and
then appealing to the outcome if and only if the schools’ priorities are acyclic. This result is
then generalized to the groups of students by Afacan (2012). Moreover, Kesten (2012) proves
that acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the student-optimal stable mechanism to be
immune to capacity manipulations. In a recent study, Kojima (2013) shows that the student-
optimal stable mechanism is separately efficient and strategy-proof in the many-to-many
matching setting if and only if the priority structure of schools is essentially homogeneous.
The current paper identifies one more sense in which such priority structures are important
for the matching market design.
While there are many negative results in finite matching markets, some of them have been
shown to disappear in large markets. In the one-to-one matching setting, Immorlica and
Mahdian (2005) demonstrate that the schools’ manipulation incentives vanish as the market
is getting large. This result is then generalized to the many-to-one matching environment
under certain conditions by Kojima and Pathak (2009).11 Moreover, in a recent paper,
Hatfield et al. (2011) study the schools’ incentives to improve themselves and show that
stable mechanisms give right incentives in large markets, whereas, they fail to do so in finite
markets.
This paper is also related to the creating fake bidders incentives literature to which com-
puter scientists well contribute. Yokoo et al. (2004) examine the incentives of bidders to
submit bids under fictitious names in combinatorial auctions. They say that an auction pro-
tocol is false-name-proof if no bidder ever can profitably submit a false name bid. They first
show that no efficient auction protocol is false-name-proof, then give a sufficient condition
which makes VCG mechanism false-name-proof. Another related paper is Todo and Conitzer
(2013) where the authors consider the object allocation problem without money. In their
setting, objects have priorities over characteristics (in the school choice context, for instance,
ences.
11Kojima and Pathak (2009) also do some equilibrium analysis.
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GPA and exam scores might be two such characteristics) rather than over agents. Agents re-
port both their preferences and characteristics. They investigate whether agents can benefit
by creating fake accounts and, to this end, they introduce two manipulation notions where
one of them is stronger. Todo and Conitzer (2013) show that the student-optimal stable
mechanism satisfies the stronger version, whereas, the Top Trading Cycles mechanism just
satisfies the weaker one without an acyclicity assumption on the objects’ priorities. While
Todo and Conitzer (2013) and the current work are close in spirit, the main difference is the
respective manipulating agents (schools are the manipulating agents in our work as opposed
to the students in Todo and Conitzer (2013)). This difference makes the papers’ respective
manipulation formulations and models different. Hence, there is no logical relation between
them. Some other papers on the creating fake identity incentives in various environments
include Conitzer (2008), Yokoo et al. (2005), and Todo et al. (2011).
3 Model & Results
A school choice problem consists of a tuple (S,C, P,, q). The first two components
are finite and disjoint sets of students and schools, respectively. Each student i ∈ S has a
preference relation Pi, which is a complete, strict, and transitive binary relation over the set
of schools C and being unassigned (denoted by ∅). Let P be the set of all such preference
relations and the list P = (Pi)i∈S is the preference profile of students. We write cRic′ if
either cPic
′ or c = c′. Each school c ∈ C has a priority order c, which is a complete, strict,
and transitive binary relation over the set of students S and keeping seat vacant, denoted
by ∅. We write = (c)c∈C for the priority order profile of schools. The last component
q = (qc)c∈C is the quota profile of schools where qc is of school c. We call the tuple (, q)
priority structure.
We interpret the priority orders of schools as their preferences and extend them to over
the set of groups of students in the responsive (Roth (1985)) way. A matching µ is an
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assignment of students to schools such that no student is assigned more than one school,
and no school is assigned to more students than its quota. We write µk for the assignment
of student (school) k ∈ S ∪ C under µ. A matching µ is individually rational if µiRi∅ for
all i ∈ S and, for any c ∈ C, there is no i ∈ µc such that ∅ c i. Matching µ is blocked by
a student-school pair (i, c) ∈ S × C if cPiµi and either i c ∅ and |µc| < qc or i c j for
some j ∈ µc. A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any pair
(i, c) ∈ S×C. In the rest of the paper as q and C will be fixed, we write (S, P,) to denote
the problem.
A mechanism ψ is a function assigning a matching for every problem (S, P,). Mecha-
nism ψ is stable if its outcome is stable at every problem instance. In the rest of the paper,
we just write ψ(P ) for the mechanism outcome whenever it does not cause confusion.
Below, we outline the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm producing the
student-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley (1962)).
Step 1. Each student applies to his first choice school. Each school tentatively assign its
seats to its acceptable12 applicants one at a time following its priority order. Any remaining
applicant is rejected.
In general,
Step t. Each student who was rejected in step (t − 1) applies to his next best choice.
Each school tentatively assigns its seats to the current acceptable applicants along with the
ones already assigned seats in the previous step one at a time following its priority order.
Any remaining applicant is rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no student applies to a school, and the tentatively held
offers at the termination step are realized as assignments. The student-optimal stable mech-
anism produces the student-optimal stable matching for every problem (Gale and Shapley
(1962)). On the other hand, the school-proposing version of the above algorithm produces
12Student i is acceptable to school c if i c ∅.
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the school-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley (1962)). Similarly, the school-optimal
stable mechanism assigns the school-optimal stable matching for every problem. In the rest
of the paper, we write ψS and ψC for the student and school-optimal stable mechanism,
respectively.
Definition 1. Mechanism ψ is weakly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a match-
ing problem instance (S, P,) if there exist a school cˆ ∈ C and another matching problem
instance (S ′, P ′,′) such that the followings satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C, i c j if and only if i ′c j,
(iii) P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ S,
(iv) ψcˆ(S
′, P ′,′) ∩ S cˆ ψcˆ(S, P,).
In words, we refer to the students in S ′\S as fictitious students and say that a mechanism
is weakly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a problem if a school can be strictly
better off by creating such students under the constraints that it can affect neither the priority
rankings of schools among non-fictitious students (Condition (ii)) nor the preference profile
of them (Condition (iii)).
Remark 1. In the definition, manipulating school cˆ compares the outcomes based on
its non-fictitious students assignments (i.e, according to cˆ rather than ′cˆ). This is very
natural since it knows that all students in the set S ′ \ S are fictitious created by itself.
Definition 2. A mechanism ψ is strongly fictitious student-proof if it is not weakly manip-
ulable via creating fictitious students at any matching problem instance (S, P,).
Proposition 1. Neither ψS nor ψC is strongly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. Consider a problem consisting of S = {i} and C = {a, b} with qa = qb = 1. Assume
that student i prefers school a to school b to being unassigned, that is, Pi : a, b, ∅. The
priorities of schools are such that a=b: i, ∅. Then, ψCi (Pi) = ψSi (Pi) = a.
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Now, let school b create fictitious student j with Pj : a, ∅. For the priority order of schools
over {i, j}, assume that ′a=′b: j, i, ∅. Then, ψCi (Pi, Pj) = ψSi (Pi, Pj) = b. Hence, school b
is better off via creating fictitious student b, which finishes the proof.
The above negative result is indeed very well expected as it is easy to see that whenever
a school does not match with its top priority group under any stable rule, then it can
manipulate the mechanism. Hence, in what follows, we weaken the manipulation concept
and investigate whether the mechanisms are manipulable via creating fictitious students in
this weak sense.
Definition 3. Mechanism ψ is strongly manipulable via creating fictitious students at a
matching problem instance (S, P,) if there exist a school cˆ ∈ C and another matching
problem instance (S ′, P ′,′) such that the followings satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C, i c j if and only if i ′c j,
(iii) P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ S,
(iv) for all i ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψi(S ′, P ′,′) = cˆ or ψi(S ′, P ′,′) = ∅,
(v) ψcˆ(S
′, P ′,′) ∩ S cˆ ψcˆ(S, P,).
The only difference between the two manipulation concepts is Condition (iv) in the
above definition. Namely, it imposes the restriction that fictitious students have to be either
unassigned or assigned the school which created them. This condition, which we interpret
as capturing the situations where it is not in the schools’ interest to create such students
where some of them get matched with a school other than the manipulating one, can realize
in real-life matching markets in the presence of some policy.
Definition 4. A mechanism ψ is weakly fictitious student-proof if it is not strongly manip-
ulable via creating fictitious students at any matching problem instance (S, P,).
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Proposition 2. Neither ψS nor ψC is weakly fictitious student-proof.
Proof. We first prove the manipulability of ψS. Consider a matching problem instance
consisting of S = {i, j}, C = {a, b}, qa = qb = 1, the following preference and priority order
profiles:
Pi : b, a, ∅,
Pj : a, b, ∅,
a: i, j, ∅,
b: j, i, ∅.
Let P = (Pi, Pj), then ψ
S(P ) = (ψSi (P ), ψ
S
j (P )) = (b, a). Now, let school b create a
fictitious student k and assume that the preference Pk and the priority rankings of schools
′ over {i, j, k} are as follows:
Pk : a, ∅, b,
′a: i, k, j, ∅,
′b: j, i, k, ∅.
Let P ′ = (Pi, Pj, Pk). Then, ψS(P ′) = (ψSi (P
′), ψSj (P
′), ψSk (P
′)) = (a, b, ∅) (note that all
the conditions in the manipulation definition are met). Hence, school b is better off through
creating fictitious student k.
For the manipulability of ψC , let us consider the same problem above with the difference
that qa = 2. Then, ψ
C(P ) = (ψCi (P ), ψ
C
j (P )) = (b, a). Let school a create fictitious student
k with the same preference profile P ′ and same priorities ′ as above. Then, ψC(P ′) =
(ψCi (P
′), ψCj (P
′), ψCk (P
′)) = (a, b, a), making school a better off.
Given the lack of even weak fictitious student-proofness, we look for some condition
on the primitives helping us to overturn at least some of the above negative results. The
extant literature shows that Ergin (2002)’s acyclicity condition has been very useful in that
sense. Specifically, the student-optimal stable mechanism admits many good properties
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including strategic ones under acyclicity condition. In what follows, we therefore investigate
the fictitious student creation incentives under acyclicity.
Definition 5 (Ergin (2002)). Given a priority structure (, q), a cycle is a, b ∈ C, i, j, k ∈ S
such that;
(i) i a j a k and k b i, and
(ii) there exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets of students Sa, Sb ⊆ S \ {i, j, k} such that
|Sa| = qa − 1, |Sb| = qb − 1, s a j for every s ∈ Sa, and s b i for every s ∈ Sb.
A priority structure (, q) is acyclic if there exists no cycle.
Definition 6. Mechanism ψ is weakly (strongly) manipulable via creating fictitious students
under acyclicity at a matching problem instance (S, P,) if there exist a school cˆ ∈ C and
another matching problem instance (S ′, P ′,′) such that (i) all the conditions in Definition
1 (Definition 3) are met, and (ii) (′, q) is acyclic.
Definition 7. A mechanism ψ is strongly (weakly) fictitious student-proof under acyclicity
if it is not weakly (strongly) manipulable via creating fictitious students under acyclicity at
any matching problem instance (S, P,).
Unfortunately, given that the priority structure (′, q) in the proof of Proposition 1 is
acyclic, it turns out that both the student and school optimal stable mechanisms are weakly
manipulable via creating fictitious students even under acyclicity.
Corollary 1. Neither ψS nor ψC is strongly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity.
Below, we obtain the first sharp difference between the student and school optimal stable
mechanisms in terms of fictitious student creation incentives under acyclic priority structures.
Theorem 1. While ψS is weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity, ψC is not.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Note that the priority structure in the proof of Proposition 2 for the manipulability of ψS
is not acyclic. Hence, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the priorities
in the sense that there is a problem instance where a school can succeed in manipulation
in the absence of the acyclicity imposition, whereas, it is otherwise impossible as the above
theorem shows.
ψC being manipulable even under acyclicity leads us to look for more stringent priority
structures. In a recent paper, Kojima (2013) considers the many-to-many matching setting
and shows that as opposed to the many-to-one setting, the student-optimal stable mecha-
nism is neither strategy-proof nor weakly Pareto efficient. Then, he introduces the so called
“essentially homogeneous” priority structures, requiring a stronger condition that acyclic-
ity does. Kojima (2013) shows that the student-optimal stable mechanism recovers those
properties (indeed, it becomes Pareto efficient) if and only if the schools’ priority structure
is essentially homogeneous. In what follows, we will show that the same is true for weak
fictitious student-proofness of ψC as well.
Definition 8 (Kojima (2013)). A priority structure (, q) is essentially homogeneous if
there exist no a, b ∈ C and i, j ∈ S such that
(i) i a j and j b i, and
(ii) There exist sets of students Sa, Sb ⊆ S \ {i, j} such that |Sa| = qa − 1, |Sb| = qb − 1,
k a j for every k ∈ Sa, and k b i for every k ∈ Sb.
Remark 2. It is easy to see that essentially homogeneous priority structures are acyclic,
yet, the converse is not true.
Definition 9. Mechanism ψ is weakly (strongly) manipulable via creating fictitious students
under essential homogeneity at a matching problem instance (S, P,) if there exist a school
cˆ ∈ C and another matching problem instance (S ′, P ′,′) such that (i) all the conditions in
Definition 1 (Definition 3) are met, and (ii) (′, q) is essentially homogeneous.
We define strong (weak) fictitious student-proofness under essential homogeneity in the
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same way as Definition 7.
As the priority structure (′, q) in the proof of Proposition 1 is essentially homogeneous,
we have the following result.
Corollary 2. Both ψS and ψC are not strongly fictitious student-proof under essential ho-
mogeneity.
However, we recover the weak fictitious student-proofness of ψC with the help of essential
homogeneity.
Theorem 2. ψC is weakly fictitious student-proof under essential homogeneity.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the priority structure given in the proof of Proposition 2 for the manipulability of ψC
is not essentially homogeneous, it is also a necessary condition. That is, there is a problem
instance where a school can succeed in manipulation through creating fictitious students in
the absence of the essential homogeneity imposition, whereas, it is otherwise impossible as
the above result shows.
Remark 3. Both acyclicity and essential homogeneity conditions are imposed on the
realized priorities. As they might be manipulated as well as true priorities, both conditions
basically require that not only any possible false priority profile (satisfying the conditions
in the manipulation definitions) satisfies them but also the true profile does. On the other
hand, if we were to impose them just on the true priorities, we could not have obtained the
positive results as the realized priorities might not be acyclic/essentially homogenous even
if the true priorities are.
Remark 4. In the manipulation notions, we assume that the fictitious students’ prior-
ities can be arranged in any way (as long as it is acyclic or essentially homogeneous in the
corresponding parts of the paper) by the school which created them. However, the schools’
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priorities might be correlated, hence, it might not be possible.13 While we need this assump-
tion in order to make analysis possible, our results would not be affected by the absence
of it. It is clear that manipulation would be harder without it, which implies that acyclic-
ity (essential homogeneity) would still be sufficient for the student (school)-optimal stable
mechanism to be weakly fictitious student-proof. On the other hand, since all the examples
for the negative results given in the paper would also work,14 the necessity of them would
be still valid as well.
Theorem 1&2 provide conditions in terms of priority structures making the mechanisms
weakly fictitious student-proof. While acyclicity is less demanding than essential homo-
geneity, it does not necessarily mean that the school-optimal stable mechanism is more
manipulable than the student-optimal stable rule in the sense that whenever the latter is
manipulable at a problem instance, then so is the former. This kind of manipulability com-
parison between mechanisms has been done by Pathak and So¨nmez (2013), and the following
notion is taken from their work.
A mechanism ψ is at least as manipulable as mechanism φ via creating fictitious students
if whenever the latter is strongly manipulable at a problem, then so is the former at the
same problem. Mechanism ψ is more manipulable via creating fictitious students than φ if
it is at least as manipulable as φ via creating fictitious students, and there exists a problem
instance at which the former is strongly manipulable, whereas, the latter is not.
Theorem 3. ψS is more manipulable via creating fictitious students than ψC.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 5. We only consider strong manipulations in the above manipulability compar-
ison analysis. As pointed out previously, under any stable rule, if a school is not matched
13For example, think of a situation where the manipulating school wants a fictitious student to be at the
top of the priority order of school a while at the bottom in that of school b. This, however, might not be
possible if the qualifications of the fictitious student, which make him top at the priority order of school a,
also put his name in a high position in that of school b as well.
14Basically, in the examples, the relevant underlyings of schools might enable the manipulating schools to
arrange the priority orders as in the proofs even without our assumption.
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with its top priority group of students, then it has incentive to manipulate the mechanism in
the weak sense. This basically implies that whenever the school-optimal stable mechanism
is weakly manipulable, then so is the student-optimal one, and vice-versa. Hence, we can
not say either one is more manipulable than the other one in terms of weak manipulations.
Remark 6. Theorem 1&2 show that the student-optimal stable mechanism requires
a less demanding priority condition for weak fictitious student-proofness than the school-
optimal rule does. On the other hand, Theorem 3 demonstrates that the former is more
manipulable than the latter. At first glance, these results seem paradoxical, yet they are not.
In the manipulability comparison analysis (Theorem 3), schools are free to arrange priorities
in any way they like (unless the relative priorities of non-fictitious students change). Hence,
Theorem 1&2 can not have any implication for the manipulability comparison analysis in
Theorem 3.
3.1 Large Market Analysis
Large market analysis has proved to be fruitful in recovering some negative results in
finite markets. Motivated by this fact, we show that the student-optimal stable mechanism
becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large under the regularity
conditions of Kojima and Pathak (2009). For the proof, we first show that whenever there is
a room for fictitious student manipulation in the strong sense, then so is there for a certain
type of priority misreporting so called “dropping strategy”. This result simply says that we
can consider the priority misreporting incentives of schools rather than fictitious students
creation incentives. This enables us to directly apply Kojima and Pathak (2009)’ result to
fictitious student creation manipulations.
A reported priority list is said to be a dropping strategy if it simply declares some students
who are acceptable under the true priority list as unacceptable. Formally, a dropping strategy
is a report ′c such that (i) s c s′ and s ′c ∅ imply s ′c s′ and (ii) ∅ c s implies ∅ ′c s.
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Lemma 1. Given a problem instance and a stable mechanism, suppose that the mechanism is
strongly manipulable by school c via creating fictitious students and matching µ is produced
through the manipulation. Then, there exists a dropping strategy of school c producing a
matching which is at least as good as µ for school c.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the rest of this section, we employ the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak
(2009). For the sake completeness, we fully describe it below.
A random market is a tuple Γ = (S,C,c, k,D). Here, k is a positive integer representing
the length of students’ preferences, that is, the number of acceptable schools that students
can declare in their preferences. On the other hand, D = (pc)c∈C is a probability distribution
over C. Each student i’s preference unfolds as follows:
Step 1. Select a school independently from D and list this school as the top choice of
student i.
In general,
Step t ≤ k. Select a school independently from D until a previously undrawn school is
drawn. List that school as the tth choice of student i.
A sequence of random markets is denoted by (Γ˜1, Γ˜2, ...) where Γ˜n = (Cn, Sn,Cn , kn,Dn)
is a random market in which |Cn| = n.
Definition 10 (Kojima and Pathak (2009)). A sequence of random markets (Γ˜1, Γ˜2, ...) is
regular if there exist positive integer k and q¯ such that
(i) kn = k for all n,
(ii) qc ≤ q¯ for c ∈ Cn for all n,
(iii) |Sn| ≤ q¯n for all n, and
(iv) for all n and c ∈ Cn, any s ∈ Sn is acceptable to c.
Given a random market Γ˜n, the expected number of schools that can strongly manipu-
late the student-optimal stable mechanism via creating fictitious students when others are
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truthful (i.e., when others do not manipulate via creating fictitious students) , denoted by
α(n), is given below:
α(n) = E[#{c ∈ Cn : school c can strongly manipulate ψS via creating fictitious students
in the induced problem (Sn, Cn, P,n, qn) when other schools are truthful}|Γ˜n].
Due to Lemma 1, we can directly apply the result of Kojima and Pathak (2009), hence,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If the sequence of random markets is regular, then the expected proportion
of schools that can strongly manipulate ψS via creating fictitious students when others are
truthful, α(n)/n, converges to zero as the number of colleges goes to infinity.
Remark 7. We have the above large market result for strong manipulations. On the
other hand, Lemma 1 is not true for the weak manipulation. That is, a school might not
have a dropping strategy giving an outcome which is at least as good as the outcome induced
through a weak fictitious student creation manipulation. For instance, consider a problem
consisting of S = {i} and C = {a, b} with qa = qb = 1. Student i prefers school a to b to
being unassigned and both schools prefer him to keeping the seat vacant. Then, under any
stable mechanism, student i is matched with school a, and school b can not be better off by
misreporting its priority. However, it can create a fictitious student j with Pj : a, b, ∅ and
′a: j, i, ∅. Then, student i is matched with school b under any stable rule, making it better
off.
4 Conclusion & Discussion
We investigate the fictitious student creation incentives of schools under the student and
school optimal stable rules. The former is weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity,
and so is the latter under essential homogeneity. Even though essential homogeneity requires
a more stringent condition than acyclicity, the student optimal stable mechanism turns out
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to be more manipulable than the school optimal stable rule. As opposed to these negative
results in finite markets, the student-optimal stable rule becomes weakly fictitious student-
proof as the market is getting large.
In our analysis, we assume that students might be unacceptable to schools.15 While there
are some schools districts where students can be unacceptable,16 since schools are considered
as objects in the conventional model, students are often assumed to be acceptable at any
school. Hence, it is worthwhile to point out that all of our results except Lemma 1 would
carry over to the smaller domain of acceptant priorities where any student is acceptable to
any school. Since Lemma 1 does not hold (as dropping strategies involve reporting students
unacceptable), we do not know whether the large market result would still be true in that
case.
Appendix
A mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof if there are no group of students A ⊆ S and a false
preference profile for them P ′A such that ψi(P
′
A, P−A)Riψi(P )
17 for all i ∈ A, with holding
strictly for at least one student in A.
Mechanism ψ is efficient if there is no matching µ such that µiRiψi(P ) for all i ∈ S, with
holding strictly for at least one student.
The following definitions are due to Kojima and Manea (2010).
A preference profile R′i is individually rational monotonic transformation of Ri at c ∈
C ∪ {∅} (R′i i.r.m.t Ri at c) if c′R′ic and c′R′i∅ ⇒ c′Ric for all c′ ∈ C; and R′ i.r.m.t R at a
matching µ if R′i i.r.m.t Ri at µi for all i ∈ S.
A mechanism ψ satisfies individually rational monotonicity if R′ i.r.m.t R at ψ(R), then
15A student i is unacceptable to school c if ∅ c i.
16As certain schools can determine their priorities at Boston and New York City school districts, they
can declare students unacceptable. Besides, in some school districts, students might not be acceptable due
to the living outside of the districts or discipline problems as well. For instance, not all school districts in
Massachusetts accept students from outside of their districts.
17P ′A and P−A stand for the preference profile of group of student A and that of the rest of the students,
respectively.
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ψi(R
′)R′iψi(R) for all i ∈ S.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove by contradiction. Let us assume that ψS is not weakly ficti-
tious student-proof under acyclicity. It implies that there exist a school c, matching problem
instances (S, P,) and (S ′, P ′,′) such that (i) (′, q) is acyclic, and (ii) the following
conditions satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C, i c j if and only if i ′c j,
(iii) P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ S,
(iv) for all i ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψSi (S ′, P ′,′) = c or ψSi (S ′, P ′,′) = ∅,
(v) ψSc (S
′, P ′,′) ∩ S c ψSc (S, P,).
Now, consider the following preference profile for students in S ′:
P ′′i =
 ψ
S
i (S, P,), ψSi (S ′, P ′,′), ∅ if i ∈ S
ψSi (S
′, P ′,′), ∅ otherwise
Let P ′′ = (P ′′i )i∈S′ . Then, we claim that ψ
S
i (S
′, P ′′,′)R′iψSi (S ′, P ′,′) for all i ∈ S ′, with
holding strictly for some j ∈ S. Once we prove this claim, proof will be finished since it
would contradict the group strategy-proofness of ψS under acyclic priority structures (Ergin
(2002)).
For ease of notation, let µ0 = ψS(S, P,), µ1 = ψS(S ′, P ′,′), and µ2 = ψS(S ′, P ′′,′).
First, from the well-known comparative statistics result (Gale and Sotomayor (1985b)),
µ0iRiµ
1
i for all i ∈ S, which means µ0iR′iµ1i (since R′i = Ri for all i ∈ S). On the other hand,
by the definition of P ′′, µ0iR
′′
i ∅ and µ0iR′′i µ1i for all i ∈ S. Moreover, for all other agents
j ∈ S ′ \ S, µ1j is his top choice under R′′j . Therefore, R′′ i.r.m.t R′ at µ1. From Kojima and
Manea (2010), we know that ψS satisfies individually rational monotonicity which implies
that µ2iR
′′
i µ
1
i for all i ∈ S ′. Then, by the definition of P ′′, we have µ2iR′iµ1i for all i ∈ S ′.
Next, by our starting supposition, we have µ1c ∩S c µ0c . This implies that there exists a
student i ∈ S such that (i) i ∈ µ1c \ µ0c and (ii) i c j for some j ∈ µ0c (j might be ∅, which
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means that school c has empty seat under µ0c and prefers student i to ∅). This along with
the stability of µ0 implies that µ0iPiµ
1
i , which means µ
0
iP
′
iµ
1
i .
Now, we claim that µ2iP
′
iµ
1
i . We prove by contradiction: let us assume that µ
1
i = µ
2
i = c.
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Since µ0iP
′
iµ
1
i , it is also true that µ
0
iP
′
iµ
2
i . Then, given µ
2
k ∈ {c, ∅} for all k ∈ S ′ \ S (by
Condition (iv)), it implies that there exists a student j ∈ S, j 6= i, such that µ0i = µ2j ,
µ0j 6= µ2j (these are due to the facts that school µ0i has no excess capacity under µ2 (otherwise
it can not be stable) and µ0i 6= µ2i ), and j µ0i i (due to the stability of µ2). Moreover, since
µ0 is stable in the problem (S, P,), we have µ0jPjµ2j , which means µ0jP ′jµ2j .
Now, let students i, j and school µ0i point to schools µ
0
i , µ
0
j and student j, respectively,
that is, we consider the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j . (1)
Then, we have the following two cases:
Case 1. If µ0j = µ
2
i , then let µ
0
j point to student i. We, hence, end up with the following:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → i. (2)
The above situation is called “improvement cycle” in the literature in the sense that there
is a room for improving efficiency by letting students i, j trade their respective assignments
under µ2. Let us denote the matching obtained by implementing this trade while keeping
the other students’ assignments unchanged by µ˜. Then, µ˜ Pareto dominates µ2 with respect
to preference profile P ′. On the other hand, since µ2iR
′
iµ
1
i for all i ∈ S ′, µ˜ is also Pareto
superior to µ1 in the problem (S ′, P ′,′). This, however, contradicts the fact that ψS is
efficient under acyclic priority structures (Ergin (2002)).
Case 2.
Step 1. If µ0j 6= µ2i = c, then since µ0jP ′jµ2j , by the same reasoning as before, there exists
18Recall that we already proved µ2iR
′
iµ
1
i .
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a student k ∈ S different than both i and j such that µ0j = µ2k, µ0k 6= µ2k, and k µ0j j.
Moreover, since µ0 is stable in the problem (S, P,), we have µ0kPkµ2k, which means that
µ0kP
′
kµ
2
k.
Now, let school µ0j and student k point to student k and school µ
0
k, respectively. Hence,
we end up with the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k. (3)
Step 2. Similar to Case 1, if there exists a student in the above sequence who is matched
with µ0k under µ
2, let µ0k point to that student. Let us say this student is j, then we have
the following:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k → j. (4)
In this case, we also end up with the improvement cycle consisting of students j, k and
schools µ0j , µ
0
k. If we denote the matching obtained by implementing this cycle while keeping
the other students’ assignments unchanged by µˆ, then µˆ Pareto dominates µ2 with respect
to preference profile P ′, which implies that it also dominates µ1 in the problem (S ′, P ′,′).
This, however, contradicts ψS being efficient under acyclic priority structures.
Step 3. If there exists no student in the sequence (3) who is matched with µ0k under
µ2, then this implies that µ0k 6= c (Since, otherwise, µ0k would point to student i, who is
matched with school c under µ2 by our supposition). Then, by the same reasoning as before,
there exists a student h ∈ S different than i, j, k such that µ0k = µ2h, µ0h 6= µ2h, and h µ0k k.
Moreover, since µ0 is stable in the problem (S, P,), µ0hPhµ2h, which means µ0hP ′hµ2h. Now,
let school µ0k and student h point to student h and school µ
0
h, respectively. We, therefore,
end up with the following sequence:
i→ µ0i → j → µ0j → k → µ0k → h→ µ0h. (5)
Then, if we continue in the same way as before, since everything is finite, we will end up
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with an improvement cycle. If we denote the matching obtained by implementing that cycle
while keeping the other students’ assignments unchanged by µ′, then µ′ Pareto dominates
µ2 with respect to P ′, which implies that it is also Pareto superior to µ1 in the problem
(S ′, P ′,′). This, however, contradicts the fact that ψS is efficient under acyclic priority
structures.
Therefore, we show that there exists a student i such that µ2iP
′
iµ
1
i while µ
2
jR
′
jµ
1
j for all
other j ∈ S ′. This, however, contradicts ψS being group strategy-proof under acyclic priority
structures (Ergin (2002)), completing the proof of the weak fictitious student-proofness of
ψS under acyclicity.
Now, for the lack of weak fictitious student-proofness of ψC even under acyclicity, we can
consider the problem instance given in the proof of Proposition 2. The priority structure
given there for ψC : (′, qa = 2, qb = 1) is acyclic, yet ψC is still strongly manipulable. Hence,
ψC is not weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclicity.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume for a contradiction that ψC is not weakly fictitious student-
proof under essential homogeneity. This means that there exist a school c′ and problem
instances (S, P,) and (S ′, P ′,′) such that (′, q) is essentially homogeneous and the fol-
lowing conditions satisfy:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C, i c j if and only if i ′c j,
(iii) P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ S,
(iv) for all i ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψCi (S ′, P ′,′) = c′ or ψCi (S ′, P ′,′) = ∅,
(v) ψCc′ (S
′, P ′,′) ∩ S c′ ψCc′ (S, P,).
It is easy to observe that any fictitious student in S ′ \ S who is unassigned has no effect
on the outcome as it implies that in the course of the school-proposing deferred acceptance
procedure, either no school makes offer to him or he declares all schools from which he receives
offer unacceptable. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that any fictitious
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student i ∈ S ′\S is matched with school c′ under ψC(S ′, P ′,′). For ease of notation,
hereafter, we write µ and µ′ for the outcomes ψC(S, P,) and ψC(S ′, P ′,′), respectively.
As S ⊂ S ′ and all fictitious students are matched with school c′, by the well-known
comparative statistics (Gale and Sotomayor (1985b)), either µ′c ′c µc or µ′c = µc for any
school c ∈ C \ {c′}, with former holding for at least one school in C \ {c′}. Moreover, by
our supposition, we have µ′c′ ∩ S ′c′ µc′ (note that ′c over S is the same as c by our
supposition).
Let C ′ = {c ∈ C : µ′c 6= µc}. Let us pick a school c ∈ C ′. From above, we know that
µ′c ′c µc which implies that there exists a student i ∈ S such that i ∈ µ′c \ µc and i ′c j for
some j ∈ µc. On the other hand, as µ is stable, µi 6= ∅. Let µi = c˜. As µi 6= µ′i, we have
c˜ ∈ C ′. Due to the stability of µ and i ′c j, we have c˜ Pi µ′i = c. Hence, this along with the
stability of µ′ implies that there exists a student k ∈ S such that k ∈ µ′c˜ \ µc˜ and k ′c˜ i. By
the same reasoning as above, µk 6= ∅ and let µk = c¯ ∈ C ′. That is, we have the following:
k ′c˜ i ′c j with µi = c˜ and µk = c¯.
If we continue in the same way as above, as everything is finite, we would end up with
a set of schools (ck)
n
k=1 where each of them in C
′ and a set of non-fictitious students (ik)n+1k=1
such that
(i) i1 ′c1 i2 ′c2 i3, ..., in ′cn in+1 = i1, and
(ii) µik+1 = ck and µ
′
ik
= ck for each k = 1, ..., n.
Now, let us consider the assignments of schools appearing in cycle (i) above under match-
ing µ′. For each ck, µ′ck \ {ik} ⊆ S ′ \ {ik, ik+1}, |µ′ck \ {ik}| = qck − 1, and i ′ck ik+1 for any
i ∈ µ′ck . This is due to the facts that ck = µik+1Pik+1µ′ik+1 = ck+1 (due to the well-known
comparative statistics by Gale and Sotomayor (1985a)) and µ′ being stable. Let us write
Sik+1 = µ
′
ck
\ {ik} for k = 1, .., n.
Now, we will create a cycle from (i) consisting of only two schools and two students.
First, if n = 2 in the above construction, then we are done. Let us assume that n > 2. Then,
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it implies that i1 ′c2 i2. As, otherwise, we would have i1 ′c1 i2 ′c2 i1. Now, we can shorten
our above cycle by removing school c1 and student i2. That is, we can consider the following
instead of (i) above:
i1 ′c2 i3 ′c3 i4..., in ′cn in+1 = i1
Therefore, we now have a cycle of reduced length by one. Moreover, from above, we
know that Si3 ⊆ S ′ \ {i2, i3} such that |Si3| = qc2 − 1 and i ′c2 i3 for any i ∈ Si3 . Moreover,
as i1 /∈ Si3 (since, µ′i1 = c1 and, by definition, Si3 = µ′c2 \ {i2}), Si3 ⊆ S ′ \ {i1, i3} such that
|Si3 | = qc2 − 1 and i ′c2 i3 for any i ∈ Si3 . We can continue in the same way until we have a
cycle consisting of only two schools and two students. Therefore, at the end, we would have
two schools a, b ∈ C ′ and two students i, j ∈ S such that
i ′a j ′b i.
Moreover, by the same as above, there exist sets of students Sa, Sb ⊆ S ′ \ {i, j} such that
|Sa| = qa − 1, |Sb| = qb − 1, k ′a j for every k ∈ Sa, and k ′b i for every k ∈ Sb. This,
however, contradicts the essential homogeneity of (′, q), finishing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first show that ψS is at least as manipulable as ψC . To this end, let
us assume that the latter is strongly manipulable via creating fictitious students at problem
(S, P,) by school c. This means that there exists (S ′, P ′,′) such that the followings hold:
(i) S ⊂ S ′,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C, i c j if and only if i ′c j,
(iii) P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ S,
(iv) for all i ∈ S ′ \ S, either ψCi (S ′, P ′,′) = c or ψCi (S ′, P ′,′) = ∅,
(v) ψCc (S
′, P ′,′) ∩ S c ψCc (S, P,).
For ease of notation, let µ = ψC(S, P,) and µ′ = ψC(S ′, P ′,′). We first claim that
any student i ∈ µ′c has higher priority than any student j ∈ µc \ µ′c. For this purpose, first
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observe that, for any student j ∈ µc\µ′c, c Pjµ′j (due to the well-known comparative statistics
result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985b)). This along with the stability of µ′ implies that any
student i ∈ µ′c has higher priority than anyone else in µc \ µ′c. Let us write s for the student
in µ′c ∩ S having the lowest priority at school c.
Let us consider the priority order ′′c for school c over S under which the relative ordering
of students having higher priority than s is the same as c, and all other students are
unacceptable.19 We write ′′= (′′c ,−c). We now claim that ψCc (S, P,′′) = µ′c ∩ S. To
this end, let us define matching µ′S as in below:
µ′Sc′ =
 µ
′
c′ ∩ S If c′ = c
µ′c′ otherwise
We first need to observe that µ′S is stable at (S, P,′′). At µ′S, as no school except
school c is matched with a fictitious student in S ′ \ S and µ′ being stable at (S ′, P ′,′),
there is no blocking pair involving a school in C \ {c}. On the other hand, school c might
have excess capacity under µ′S since we exclude its fictitious student assignment under µ′.
First, consider the students having lower priority than s. As they are unacceptable under
′′c , they do not form a blocking pair with school c. On the other hand, for all other students,
the relative ordering under ′′c is the same as that of under both c and ′c (recall that c
and ′c are the same over S). Therefore, as µ′ is stable at (S ′, P ′,′), they do not form a
blocking pair with school c as well. Hence, µ′S is stable at (S, P,′′). On the other hand,
ψC(S, P,′′) is stable at the same problem as well. Moreover, since school c is matched
with fictitious students under µ′, |µ′Sc | < qc (If it were not matched with fictitious students
under µ′, then the outcome would not change by creating fictitious students as explained
in detail in proof of Theorem 2). Therefore, by the rural hospital theorem (Roth (1986)),
ψCc (S, P,′′) = µ′Sc = µ′c ∩ S.
In what follows, we will first think of a fictitious student manipulation scenario under
ψS and show that the part of the student-optimal stable matching over S at the artificial
19Recall that student i is unacceptable to school c with c if ∅ c i.
27
problem is stable at (S, P,′′). Then, the result will follow from the rural hospital theorem
(Roth (1986)).
Now, consider a set of students S ′′ such that S ⊂ S ′′ and |S ′′ \S| = qc. For the preference
of each fictitious student i ∈ S ′′\S, consider P˜i : c, ∅. That is, only the school c is acceptable.
We write P˜ = (P˜S′′\S, PS). Lastly, for the priority order of school c over S ′′, let us enumerate
each fictitious student k ∈ S ′′ \ S and write #k for the index of fictitious student k. Then,
the priority order of school c over S ′′, ˜c, is defined as follows:
For any i ∈ S ′′ \ S and j ∈ {k ∈ S : s c k}, i ˜c j;
For any i ∈ S ′′ \ S and j ∈ {k ∈ S : k c s} ∪ {s}, j ˜c i.
For any i, j ∈ S ′′ \ S, i ˜c j iff #i > #j.
The priority orders of schools c′ ∈ C \ {c} over S ′′, ˜c′ , can be anything as long as the
relative ordering over S is preserved by our supposition. Now, let us consider the artificial
problem (S ′′, P˜ , ˜). Let µ˜ = ψS(S ′′, P˜ , ˜). As only acceptable school for fictitious students
in S ′′ \ S is school c, they can matched with only school c at µ˜. Now, consider the following
matching µ˜S:
µ˜Sc′ =
 µ˜c′ ∩ S If c
′ = c
µ˜ otherwise
We now claim that µ˜S is stable at (S, P,′′). We will follow the same steps as before in
showing the stability of µ′S. At matching µ˜, since no school other than school c is matched
with a fictitious student in S ′′ \ S and µ˜ being stable at (S ′′, P˜ , ˜), there is no blocking
pair involving a school in C \ {c}. On the other hand, school c might have excess capacity
under µ˜S since we exclude its fictitious student assignment under µ˜. However, as all students
having lower priority than s are unacceptable under ′′c , they do not form a blocking pair
with school c. On the other hand, if any student k ∈ S such that k ′′c s were to form a
blocking pair with school c, then µ˜ could not have been stable at (S ′′, P˜ , ˜) as the relative
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ordering of such students under ˜c is the same as ′′c (note that any fictitious student has
lower priority than those ones under ˜c). Therefore, µ˜S is stable at (S, P,′′).
Now, we have two stable matchings µ˜S and ψC(S, P,′′) at (S, P,′′). Recall that
ψCc (S, P,′′) = µ′c∩S. On the other hand, we know that |µ′c∩S| < qc. Therefore, by the Rural
hospital theorem (Roth (1986)), we have µ˜Sc = µ
′
c∩S. This means that µ˜c∩S c ψS(S, P,),
hence, ψS is strongly manipulable via creating fictitious student proof at (S, P,) as well,
showing that ψS is at least as manipulable as ψC .
For a problem instance at which ψC is not strongly manipulable via creating fictitious
student, yet ψS is manipulable, consider a problem consisting of S = {i, j} and C = {a, b}
with qa = qb = 1. The preference and priority order profiles are as follows:
Pi : a, b, ∅; Pj : b, a, ∅;
a: j, i, ∅; b: i, j, ∅.
Then, ψCa (P ) = j and ψ
C
b (P ) = i, hence, schools do not have incentive to manipulate ψ
C
as they are already matched with their first choices. However, ψSa (P ) = i and ψ
S
b (P ) = j.
Now, let school b create fictitious student k with Pk : a, b, ∅. Assume that the new priority
orders of schools are as follows:
′a: j, k, i and ′b: i, k, j.
Let P ′ = (Pi, Pj, Pk), then ψSb (S
′, P ′,′) = i and ψSa (S ′, P ′,′) = j. Hence, school b is
better off, showing the manipulability of ψS.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let us consider a problem instance (S, P,) and stable mechanism ψ.
Assume that school c can strongly manipulate ψ at the given problem through creating
fictitious students. Let (S ′, P ′,′) be the artificial problem including fictitious students
created by school c. By our supposition, ψ(S ′, P ′,′)∩S c ψ(S, P,). For ease of notation,
let µ′ = ψ(S ′, P ′,′).
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Now let us consider the priority order ′′c over S for school c under which the relative
ordering over µ′c∩S is the same as c, and any student who is not in µ′c∩S is unacceptable.
We write ′′= (′′c ,−c). Below, we define a new matching µ′′ :
µ′′c′ =
 µ
′
c ∩ S If c′ = c
µ′c′ otherwise
Note that, as school c strongly manipulate ψ by our supposition, µ′c′ ⊂ S for any c′ ∈
C \{c}. We now claim that µ′′ is stable at (S, P,′′). First, there can not be a blocking pair
involving school c′ ∈ C \ {c} as, otherwise, such pair would block matching µ′ at (S ′, P ′,′),
contradicting the stability of µ′. On the other hand, school c is not involved in a blocking pair
as any student i ∈ S \µ′′c is unacceptable under ′′c . Therefore, µ′′ is stable at (S, P,′′). On
the other hand, ψ(S, P,′′) is another stable matching. Then, by the Rural hospital theorem
(Roth (1984)), we know that |µ′′c | = |ψc(S, P,′′)|. Moreover, as the group of students µ′′c is
the only acceptable ones under ′′c , we have µ′′c = ψc(S, P,′′) = µ′c ∩ S. This shows that
µ′c ∩ S can be obtained through dropping strategy ′′c as well, which finishes the proof.
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